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COLORING OUTSIDE THE LINES: A RESPONSE TO PROFESSOR
SEAMON’S ARTICLE DISMANTLING MONUMENTS
Hope Babcock*
In Dismantling Monuments,1 Professor Richard H. Seamon defends
President Donald Trump’s recent proclamations modifying the
boundaries of two national monuments, Grand Staircase-Escalante and
Bears Ears, that Presidents Clinton and Obama each designated at the
ends of their Administrations.2 Professor Seamon argues that the
Antiquities Act3 does not authorize the creation of monuments as large as
these,4 and that President Trump, who has a constitutional duty to take
care that all laws are faithfully executed,5 must take action to correct these
ultra vires acts. He has little doubt that reducing the size of a previously
designated national monument is consistent with the text of the
Antiquities Act, its legislative history, and the prior practice of former
Presidents and earlier Congresses.6 He finds additional authority to
rescind these designations in a puzzling maxim that since a greater power
must be encompassed in a smaller one, reduction in the size of a
previously designated monument implies the power to rescind it
completely.7 He also finds support for his position in congressional
silence in the face of similar action by prior presidents, as well as in the
existence of a “general rule”8 that presidents should not “tie the hands”
* Professor of Law; Director, Institute for Public Representation Environmental Law
Clinic, Georgetown Law.
1. Richard H. Seamon, Dismantling Monuments, 70 FLA. L. REV. 553 (2018).
2. Proclamation No. 9682, 82 Fed. Reg. 58,089 (Dec. 4, 2017) (modifying Grand
Staircase-Escalante National Monument); Proclamation No. 9681, 82 Fed. Reg. 58,081 (Dec. 4,
2017) (modifying Bears Ears National Monument); see also Jennifer Yachnin, Trump touts Utah
rollbacks in row with Romney, E&E NEWS (Jan. 2, 2019) (“Despite opposition from conservation
advocates, Trump undid protections for 85% of the 1.35-million-acre Bears Ears National
Monument and nearly half of the 1.9 million acres in the Grand Staircase-Escalante National
Monument. Those reductions are being challenged in federal court.”).
3. 16 U.S.C. §§ 431–33 (1906) (current version at 54 U.S.C. §§ 320301–320303 (2012)).
4. Grand Staircase-Escalante is 1,700,000 acres, Hope M. Babcock, Rescission of a
Previously Designated National Monument: A Bad Idea Whose Time Has Not Come, 37 STAN.
ENVTL. L. J. 3, 8 (2017), and Bears Ears is 1,351,849 acres and is jointly managed by the Bureau
of Land Management and the Forest Service. Bear Ears National Monument Questions &
Answers, U.S. FOREST SERV., https://www.fs.fed.us/sites/default/files/bear-ears-fact-sheet.pdf
[https://perma.cc/FM3R-YA25].
5. U.S. Const. art. II. § 3 (“[H]e shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed . . .
.”). President Trump reduced Grand Staircase-Escalante National Monument to slightly less than
50% of its original size and Bears Ears to 16% of its original size. Hannah Nordhaus, What
Trump’s Shrinkage of National Monuments Actually Means, NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC (Feb. 2, 2018),
https://news.nationalgeographic.com/2017/12/trump-shrinks-bears-ears-grand-staircaseescalante-national-monuments/ [https://perma.cc/V2S6-64SQ].
6. Seamon, supra note 1, at 575–83.
7. Id. at 584–86.
8. Id. at 588.
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of their successors.9
Professor Seamon is not alone in making these arguments,10 as I am
not alone in saying that Professor Seamon’s arguments, while wellintentioned, are wrong.11 He exaggerates the persuasive power of
congressional silence. He elevates the importance of the statute’s original
intent. Professor Seamon and I read the text and legislative history of the
Antiquities Act differently—he sees unlimited presidential power, I see
limits.12 We disagree on how the law’s purpose has evolved over time
and whether Congress, the courts, or both have curbed that evolution.13
We disagree over the importance of § 204(j) of Federal Land Policy &
Management Act (FLPMA), which I, and others,14 argue reconfirms the
textual clarity of § 431 of the Antiquities Act that only Congress can
rescind or modify the boundaries of a previously designated national
monument.15 We also disagree about whether the President has an
implied power to revoke or modify a previously designated monument—
he finds and celebrates that power, I find no such power and warn that its
use would violate the separation of powers doctrine and well-established
norms of delegated power.16 Most of these counter arguments can be
found in my article, Rescission of a Previously Designated National

9. Id. at 588–90.
10. See generally, e.g., John Yoo & Todd Gaziano, Presidential Authority to Revoke or
Reduce National Monument Designations, AM. ENTER. INST. (2017).
11. See, e.g., Mark Squillace et al., Presidents Lack the Authority to Abolish or Diminish
National Monuments, 103 VA. L. REV. ONLINE 55, 56 (2017); see also Mark Squillace, The
Monumental Legacy of the Antiquities Act of 1906, 37 GA. L. REV. 473, 475 (2003) (discussing
the legacy and history of the Antiquities Act as well as proposals to reform or repeal it).
12. Compare Seamon, supra note 1, at 556 (arguing presidents have the power to revoke or
abolish a previously designated national monument, especially when the power has been exercised
contrary to the Act’s authorization), with Babcock, supra note 4, at 52–65 (arguing, among other
things, that neither the text of the Antiquities Act nor interpretive canons authorize a President to
revoke or amend a prior President’ designation of a national monument).
13. Compare Seamon, supra note 1, at 579 (commenting on how presidents “have
repeatedly diminished monuments,” and Congress has acquiesced in those actions), with Babcock,
supra note 4, at 5, 16–18, 22–27 (contending that until President Trump “no President has ever
rescinded a designation made by a prior President”, that congressional attempts to repeal or amend
the Act consistently failed, and that courts have exercised maximum restraint in reviewing
presidential designations).
14. See, e.g., Squillace et al., supra note 11, at 56 (contending FLPMA makes it clear that
the President lacks implied authority to revoke or modify a previous designation).
15. Compare Seamon, supra note 1, at 597–99 (finding no support in FLPMA’s legislative
history or text of § 204(j) for such a proposition), with Babcock, supra note 4, at 52–56 (arguing
that § 204(j) reaffirmed the clarity of § 431 of the Antiquities Act that only Congress has the
authority to rescind or modify a previously designated national monument).
16. Compare Seamon, supra note 1, at 584 (stating three reasons why a President has the
implied power to revoke prior monument designations), with Babcock, supra note 4, at 61–65
(rejecting that concept).
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Monument: A Bad Idea Whose Time Has Not Yet Come.17
But rather than engaging in hand-to-hand combat with Professor
Seamon over who is right with respect to the specific arguments we each
make, I think it may be more useful, certainly more interesting, to
broaden the discussion to include: (1) the importance over time of an
Act’s original intent; (2) the correct role of the Take Care Clause in the
debate we are having; (3) the use of the interpretive canon of textual
ambiguity18 to resolve our differences; and (4) the impact of his
arguments on the separation of powers doctrine.
I. THE UNIMPORTANCE OF A LAW’S ORIGINAL INTENT AND MORE
MODERN APPROACHES TO STATUTORY INTERPRETATION.
The Antiquities Act is quite brief, surprisingly so when one considers
how much public land has been protected under its aegis. 19 Section 1 of
the Act makes it a crime for anyone to “appropriate, excavate, injure, or
destroy any historic or prehistoric ruin or monument, or any object of
antiquities” located on lands that the federal government owns or controls
without permission from the agency with management authority over
those lands.20 The penalties for violating this provision are quite severe—
either or both a fine, not to exceed five hundred dollars, or ninety days in
jail at a court’s discretion.21 The Act’s most controversial provision is
§ 431, which authorizes the President, “in his discretion,” “to declare by
public proclamation historic landmarks, historic and prehistoric
structures, and other objects of historic or scientific interest,” on federal
lands, “to be national monuments.”22 The section also gives the President
discretion “to reserve . . . parcels of land [which shall] in all cases . . . be
confined to the smallest area compatible with the proper care and
management of the objects to be protected.”23 The interpretation of § 431
17. 37 STAN. L.J. 3 (2017).
18. See generally Curtis A. Bradley & Neil S. Siegel, After Recess: Historical Practice,
Textual Ambiguity, and Constitutional Adverse Possession, 2014 SUP. CT. REV. 1 (examining,
among other things, the relationship between historical practices and textual ambiguity in a study
of the Court’s decision in NLRB v. Noel Canning).
19. Monuments Protected Under the Antiquities Act, NAT’L PARKS CONSERVATION ASS’N
(Jan. 13, 2017), https://www.npca.org/resources/2658-monuments-protected-under-theantiquities-act [https://perma.cc/NDR3-KUG5] (listing all the national monuments designated
under the Antiquities Act).
20. 16 U.S.C. § 431 (1906) (current version at 54 U.S.C. §§ 320301 (2012)).
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id. Often ignored is § 432, which authorizes the Departments of Interior and Agriculture
to issue “rules and regulations for the purpose of carrying out” the Act’s provisions. 16 U.S.C. §
432 (1906) (current version at 54 U.S.C. §§ 320302 (2012)). Although § 432 is a specific
delegation of administrative authority to federal agencies to implement the law’s provisions, the
section does not cede Congress’ superior legislative authority to interpret and implement the Act
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is at the heart of Professor Seamon and my disagreement.
While both Professor Seamon and I agree that the Antiquities Act was
a product of legislative compromise and largely recount the same
legislative history ending in its enactment,24 our agreement stops there.
We disagree over the extent to which the final law left room for the
protection of more than historical objects, such as large landscapes
containing objects of historic or scientific interest, and over the amount
of land required to protect those objects. I argue that those two questions
are unresolved in either the legislative history or the law itself;25
Professor Seamon argues the reverse.26 We also interpret Congress’
failure to check perceived Presidential excess very differently. He
attributes Congress’ failure to curb what he calls “abuse” of the Act’s
legislative intent to its institutional inability to act unilaterally.
Comparing this to a president who “is as free as a cowboy.”27 I see in
Congress’ inaction, its consistent resistance to the idea of curtailing the
President’s designation authority––a demeanor made even more striking
by the fact that over the years Congress has considered and rejected
legislation seeking to rescind or even amend the Antiquities Act for many
of the same reasons raised by today’s critics of the Act, like Professor
Seamon.28 Professor Seamon’s failure to discuss how the courts have
viewed the scope of the President’s powers under the Antiquities Act may
be because, with only one exception,29 courts have generally sustained
those actions.30
Given the wide divergence in the views of the Act, how much weight
to the Administration. See Waynan v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1, 43 (1825) (“Congress may
certainly delegate to others, powers which the legislature may rightfully exercise itself.”).
24. Compare Seamon, supra note 1, at 561–67 (emphasizing that part of the legislative
history supports the Act’s narrow focus), with Babcock, supra note 4, at 13–16 (pointing out that
the history left open the type of artifacts to be protected and the amount of land necessary to
protect the object that was the subject of the designation).
25. Babcock, supra note 4, at 16.
26. Seamon, supra note 1, at 567 (“[T]he 1906 Act was designed to allow the President to
designate discrete objects as national monuments and, for each such object, to reserve only the
smallest amount of land necess[a]ry to protect that object.” (alteration in original) (internal
quotations omitted)).
27. Seamon, supra note 1, at 574.
28. See Babcock, supra note 4, at 18 (discussing some of those criticisms).
29. Anaconda Copper Co. v. Andrus, 14 Env’t Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1853, 1854 (D. Alaska
1980) (challenging President Carter’s use of the statute to designate fifteen new national
monuments, to expand the boundaries of two existing monuments, and to withdraw more than
fifty-six million acres in Alaska to protect public lands until Congress enacted protective
legislation).
30. See Wyoming v. Franke, 58 F. Supp. 890, 896 (D. Wyo. 1945) (“[I]f the Congress
presumes to delegate its inherent authority to the Executive Departments which exercise
acquisitive proclivities not actually intended, the burden is on the Congress to pass such remedial
legislation as may obviate any injustice brought about as the power and control over and
disposition of government lands inherently rests in its Legislative branch.”).

2018]

COLORING OUTSIDE THE LINES

55

should be given to its intent? I argue not much. I believe of greater import
is the practice of government institutions in implementing the statute.
Here, contrary to Professor Seamon, practice shows presidents
generously exercise their discretion to identify and then reserve areas
under § 2 of the Antiquities Act, unchecked by the courts or Congress.31
In the field of statutory interpretation the idea that “practice informs
the content of constitutional law” is referred to as “historical gloss.”32
Courts may and often do consider historical gloss when interpreting the
meaning of a statutory text.33 Governmental practices can also be invoked
to support “what legal and political theorists” term “constitutional
conventions,” a catchall phrase used by legal and political theorists to
cover those “maxims, beliefs, and principles” that “guide officials in how
they exercise political discretion.”34 To act contrary to an historical gloss
violates a legal understanding, while contradicting a convention violates
“the spirit of the constitution, even if it does not violate any particular
rule.”35 Thus, historical gloss has legal status and conventions do not.36
Both interpretive approaches have some “normative force”—
conventions more so outside the courts as they are not law-based.
The cases discussed in Bradley and Siegel’s articles on interpreting
constitutional text involve the allocation of power between Congress and
the Executive Branch. In NLRB v. Noel Canning,37 for example, the Court
wrote that since “the interpretive questions before it concern the
allocation of power between two elected branches of Government . . . it
would put significant weight upon historical practice,” even if “the nature
or longevity of that practice is subject to dispute . . . .”38 Although not a
matter of constitutional interpretation, the dispute over the meaning of
§ 431 of the Antiquities Act, involves, among other things, the historical
practices of the two elected branches of government. Thus, the resolution
of that dispute might be amenable to consideration of historical gloss as
31. Presidents have declared a 157 national monuments since the law’s enactment in 1906.
Squillace et al., supra note 11, at 55.
32. Curtiss A. Bradley & Neil S. Siegel, Historical Gloss, Constitutional Conventions and
the Separation of Powers, 105 GEO. L. REV. 255, 257 (2017) [hereinafter Bradley & Siegel,
Historical Gloss]; see generally Bradley & Siegel, supra note 18 (analyzing the Court’s use of
historical gloss in NLRB v. Noel Canning in the face of textual ambiguity and the concept of
constitutional adverse possession).
33. See, e.g., Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 610–11 (1952)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring) (“[A] systematic, unbroken, executive practice, long pursued to the
knowledge of the Congress and never before questioned . . . may be treated as a gloss on
‘executive Power’ vested in the President by § 1 of Art. II.”).
34. Bradley & Siegel, Historical Gloss, supra note 32, at 257.
35. Id. at 257 (quoting Keith Whittington).
36. Id. at 268.
37. 134 S. Ct. 2550 (2014).
38. Id. at 2559–60. See also Bradley & Siegel, Historical Gloss, supra note 32, at 261.
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a tool “to help clarify purportedly ambiguous text.”39 In the case of the
Antiquities Act, historical practice conforms to a view of unfettered
Presidential interpretive discretion, not to the cabined view of Professor
Seamon.
Constitutional conventions can also constrain the exercise of
governmental authority. Bradley and Siegel suggest that violation of a
convention is not simply an act of “bad policy, but a deviation from norms
of good institutional citizenship that help sustain the constitutional
system.”40 Thus, conventions, although not based on law, exercise a
moral force on political actors that can be as powerful as a judicially
enforced historical gloss put on some statutory text. To the extent that
Professor Seamon is endorsing President Trump’s rescission of two
previously designated national monuments, he is supporting the violation
of those maxims and beliefs that give weight to prior actions taken under
congressionally delegated authority.
Use of neither interpretive approach supports Professor Seamon’s
position that § 431 of the Antiquities Act constrains a president’s
discretion to designate a national monument. In fact, consideration of past
practices and maxims might ease the path to resolving open textual
questions like what constitutes an object of scientific interest or the size
of the reservation.
II. PROFESSOR SEAMON’S ARGUMENT ON THE TAKE CARE CLAUSE
IS UNAVAILING.
Professor Seamon argues that the President’s duty to take care that
laws passed by Congress are faithfully executed imposes an affirmative
duty on the President to “modify or abolish” any national monument
designated by a prior President in violation of law.41 He argues that the
Take Care Clause makes a President responsible for violations of federal
laws, even if he was not the cause of those violations.42 However, in
support of that proposition, Professor Seamon cites inapposite cases. Two
cases, Myers v. United States43 and Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Co.
Accounting Oversight Board,44 involve the Court striking down laws that
restricted the President’s authority to remove subordinates45—not an
issue here. A third case, Printz v. United States,46 invalidated a law that
transferred federal authority for executing a federal law to state and local
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.

Id. at 263.
Id. at 266.
Seamon, supra note 1, at 588.
Id. at 586.
272 U.S. 52 (1926).
561 U.S. 477 (2010).
See id. at 513–14; Myers, 272 U.S. at 176.
521 U.S. 898 (1997).
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law enforcement agents over whom the President had no control47—also
not pertinent to the situation at hand. The final case he cites, Lujan v.
Defenders of Wildlife,48 involves plaintiffs’ standing to challenge a
federal law.49 The statement from the case quoted in Professor Seamon’s
article that such an interpretation would unconstitutionally “transfer from
the President to the courts the Chief Executive’s most important
constitutional duty, ‘to take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed,’”50
is dicta, taken entirely out of context. To say that “these decision require
interpreting the Antiquities Act to allow the President to modify or
abolish a monument established by a prior president”51 is a stretch.
Professor Seamon is right that the Take Care Clause together with
Article II imposes on the President the responsibility to be sure that laws
enacted by Congress are implemented as Congress intended. Indeed,
courts view that clause “as the direct constitutional source of the
President’s obligation to respect legislative supremacy” and not to act
contrary to law.52 However, there is nothing in the Take Care Clause or
in how courts have interpreted it that makes the President responsible for
upholding any law or for preventing its violation. For certain, application
of the Clause here does not enable President Trump to waive language in
FLPMA preventing him from affecting a prior President’s designation of
a national monument or accreting to himself the power to rescind or
modify an existing monument, when the only authority granted to the
President by the Antiquities Act is to identify and protect historic
structures and objects of scientific interest.53 Ironically, the Take Care
Clause prevents him from doing those things.
“[A]ny authority conferred by the Take Care Clause ‘starts and ends
with the laws Congress has enacted.’”54 The Take Care Clause prevents
the President from creating exceptions to, or exemptions from, a
legislative directive.55 Yet, this is exactly what President Trump has done
by substantially modifying the boundaries of two previously designated
national monuments—actions Professor Seamon endorses. As such, these
actions are “highly suspect”56 and certainly outside the province of the
Take Care Clause.

47. Id. at 933.
48. 504 U.S. 555 (1992).
49. Id. at 557–58.
50. Seamon, supra note 1, at 587 (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 577).
51. Id. at 588.
52. Babcock, supra note 4, at 68–69.
53. Id. at 69–70.
54. Id. at 70 (quoting Jack Goldsmith & John Manning, The Protean Take Care Clause,
164 U. PA. L. REV. 1835, 1850 (2016)).
55. Id.
56. Id.
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III. THE INVERTED ARGUMENT THAT THE POWER TO REDUCE IMPLIES
THE POWER TO RESCIND AND THE SELF-LABELED “RULE” THAT
PRESIDENTS SHOULD “NOT TIE THE HANDS OF THEIR SUCCESSORS” ARE
UNPERSUASIVE.
Although Professor Seamon equates them, reduce and rescind are very
different concepts—to rescind is to revoke, void, annul, or cancel
something, while to reduce is to decrease or lessen something, not to
abolish it. The power to reduce the size of something is a lesser power
than to cancel something completely. It defies logic to propound, as
Professor Seamon does, that a greater power can fit within a lesser power
and that the lesser power can imply the existence of a greater power.57
Contrary to Professor Seamon, a President being able to reduce the
size of a previously designated monument because of a mistake in its
boundaries or in the existence of the objects the monument was
established to protect does not logically “compel the conclusion” that a
subsequent President can revoke that designation.58 Even if that were
true, President Trump’s proclamations are not an example of his
correcting any errors Presidents Clinton or Obama made in their
designations. Rather, his proclamations reconfiguring their designations
reflect a policy disagreement with his predecessors over how much land
should have been reserved.
Executive actions taken pursuant to a legislative delegation, like
proclamations designating national monuments, do bind the hands of
subsequent executives. Professor Seamon’s attempt to equate a
presidential proclamation issued under § 431 of the Antiquities Act with
an ordinary executive order, so it can be easily modified,59 understates
the role of Congress in the former.60 “[T]he fact that presidential
proclamations designating national monuments are issued under the
authority of the Antiquities Act gives them more than the usual hortatory

57. See Seamon, supra note 1, at 584–86 (“If the President can reduce a monument to
exclude lands that the President determines were not properly included in the first place, logic
compels the conclusion that the President can abolish a monument that the President determines
was not properly created in the first place—say, because it did not contain antiquities entitled to
protection under the Act.”).
58. Id. at 585.
59. Id. at 588 (“[T]he difference between Executive orders and proclamations is more one
of form than of substance.”).
60.Professor Seamon mistakenly equates presidential action under a specific congressional
mandate with presidential executive orders, the over-riding of which he correctly finds common.
See id.; see also Pamela Baldwin, CRS Report for Congress: Authority of a President to Modify
or
Eliminate
a
National
Monument
(2000),
http://congressionalresearch.com/RS20647/document.php?study=Authority+of+a+President+to
+Modify+or+Eliminate+a+National+Monument [https://perma.cc/G3YG-XN73] (commenting
that executive orders relate to intra-executive branch actions).
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power with respect to the general public”;61 unlike an executive order,
they tie the hands of subsequent presidents unless Congress steps in.
IV. PROFESSOR SEAMON’S ARGUMENTS UNDERCUT THE SEPARATION OF
POWERS DOCTRINE.
Although the separation of powers doctrine is not stated in the text of
the Constitution, it is “an indispensable part of our theory of politics” in
this country, indeed of “our American constitutionalism.”62 Respect for
the functional distinctiveness of the three branches of government
underlies the doctrine, and courts guard against one branch encroaching
into the province of the others or any “aggrandizement” of power by one
branch to the detriment of the other two that would destabilize the balance
of power among them.63 I contend in my article that any action by a sitting
President to rescind or modify a previously designated national
monument, a power that Congress reserved to itself in the Antiquities
Act, impermissibly encroaches on the powers of the Legislative Branch
and violates the separation of powers doctrine.64
By advocating that President Trump has this authority, Professor
Seamon is suggesting that the President can engage in a legislative
function—the amendment of a law, here the FLPMA, by excising an
offending provision, § 204(j), which prohibits a President from affecting
in any way a prior President’s designation.65 In § 204(j), Congress made
its policy preferences clear that designations by prior presidents cannot
be modified or revoked. Professor Seamon is correct that language
denying this power to the Secretary did not reserve it to Congress. 66 But
that does not change the essential fact that Congress enacted the
Antiquities Act under its sole authority “to dispose of and make all
needful Rules and Regulations” governing federal lands,67 and that a
President, who designates a national monument, is acting under and
within that authority. Therefore, only Congress has the power to affect a
previous designation—here, the lesser power to revoke or rescind a
pervious designation is clearly encompassed in the greater, power to
designate in the first place. To the extent that those earlier actions by
previous presidents exceeded delegated authority in the Antiquities Act,
61. Babcock, supra note 4, at 10.
62. Jeremy Waldron, Separation of Powers in Thought and Practice, 54 B.C. L. REV. 433,
436 (2013).
63. Babcock, supra note 4, at 67.
64. See id. at 70.
65. See id. at 70–72 (equating presidents ignoring specific congressional directives with
their refusing to enforce a law or comply with directives about how a law should be complied
with).
66. Seamon, supra note 1, at 597.
67. See U.S. CONST., art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.
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corrective action lies in the Legislative, not the Executive Branch, as the
Judicial Branch has made clear; to argue otherwise subverts the
separation of powers doctrine.
Much separates Professor Seamon and me regarding the extent to
which the Antiquities Act binds subsequent Presidents to respect the
actions of their predecessors. Less apparent are the weaknesses in the
rationales Professor Seamon uses to support President Trump’s action
modifying his predecessors designation, including the reliance on the
Act’s original intent, the robust interpretation of the Take Care Clause
imbuing the President with untethered corrective powers, the imaginative
re-imagining of certain sophisms, and the subversive reading of the
separation of powers doctrine which perversely vests in the President the
very powers President Trump accuses Presidents Clinton and Obama of
improperly using—coloring outside the statutory lines. But our
disagreements are not surprising. They reflect the incessant debate over
the use of our public lands that have historically divided this country and,
in all likelihood, will continue to divide us as long as those lands exist.

